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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Amber C. May appeals from the judgment entered upon her conditional
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. May claims the district court
erred in denying her motion to suppress.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Trooper Joshua Kagarice conducted a traffic stop on a car in which May
was the passenger. (R., p.9.) Both May and the driver “displayed signs of
methamphetamine use,” were extremely nervous, and made furtive movements.
(R., p.9.) After receiving information that the driver was on felony probation for
methamphetamine use, Trooper Kagarice conducted a search of the car
pursuant to the driver’s probation waiver. (R., p.9.) Prior to the search, Trooper
Kagarice frisked May due to concerns that she was armed and dangerous.
(R., p.9; see generally 5/15/2012 Tr., pp.7-18.)

During the frisk, Trooper

Kagarice “found a hard object approximately 5 inches long which was concealed
inside [May’s] knee high boots on the outside of her left calf.” (R., pp.9-10.)
Trooper Kagarice had May “remove her boot,” which revealed a “leopard print
pouch with a hard object in it” that Trooper Kagarice “immediately recognized . . .
to be a smoking pipe.” (R., p.10.) Inside the pouch, Trooper Kagarice “found a
glass pipe with burned residue which appeared to be methamphetamine, a small
bag which contained a white crystal substance, a small white pill container with a
white crystal substance in it,” a “bundle of what appeared to be more bags” that
each “contained a small amount of the same type of white crystal substance,”
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and “a small plastic wrapper which contained several prescription pills” that May
identified as Hydrocodone. (R., p.10.)
The state charged May with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.1617, 21, 29-30.) May filed a motion to suppress, asserting the “warrantless stop
and arrest by the officers was unlawful and without legal justification.” (R., pp.31,
38.) May subsequently filed a memorandum in support of her motion articulating
the grounds for suppression as (1) the traffic stop was unlawfully extended, 1 and
(2) “there was no basis for [Trooper] Kagarice to believe that [May] was armed
and dangerous.” (R., pp.41-43.) At the conclusion of the suppression hearing,
May asked the court to allow time for additional briefing, which the court granted.
(5/17/2012 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-4, p.30, Ls.2-4.) May later “advised the Court that no
further briefing [would] be filed,” and the court entered an order denying May’s
motion to suppress.

(R., p.70; see 5/17/2012 Tr., p.22, L.6 – p.29, L.22

(preliminary findings and conclusions on motion).)
After the district court denied May’s motion, May entered a conditional
guilty plea to the possession charge, preserving her right to appeal the district
court’s suppression decision. (R., pp.75-76.) The court imposed a unified sixyear sentence, with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed
May on probation.

(R., pp.97-100.)

May filed a timely notice of appeal.

(R., pp.86-88.)
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On appeal, May does not pursue this basis for suppression. (Appellant’s Brief,
p.4 n.3.)
2

ISSUE
May states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. May’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s Brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has May failed to establish the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress after concluding May was lawfully frisked?
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ARGUMENT
May Has Failed To Establish Error In The Denial Of Her Suppression Motion
A.

Introduction
May contends the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-13.) Specifically, May asserts suppression was required
because Trooper Kagarice frisked her based on his belief “that officers are
always allowed to frisk lawfully detained car passengers in order to maintain
control over the scene” and because “he simply assumes everyone he
encounters in his official capacity as a police officer is armed and dangerous until
he knows differently.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.) May further asserts that the
district court erred in finding Trooper Kagarice had an objectively reasonable
belief that May was armed and dangerous. (Appellant’s Brief, p.9.) May’s claims
that Trooper Kagarice frisked her based on his beliefs about law enforcement’s
authority to conduct frisks to “maintain control” and based on his assumptions
regarding the presence of weapons is belied by the record. Application of the
correct legal standards to the evidence presented supports the district court’s
decision that May was lawfully frisked. May has failed to show any error in the
denial of her motion to suppress.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
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State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). The power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw
factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho
102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555,
989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Denying
May’s Motion To Suppress The Evidence Discovered During A Lawful
Frisk
May’s behavior and the circumstances surrounding the traffic stop

provided reasonable articulable suspicion that May was armed and dangerous
and posed a risk to officer safety such that a self-protective pat down search was
warranted. Under the Fourth Amendment, it is constitutionally permissible for “an
officer to conduct a limited self-protective pat down search of a detainee in order
to remove any weapons.” State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21
(2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996 P.2d 298, 301 (2000)).
Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the officers on the
scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the totality
of the circumstances.” Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations
and citation omitted). The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the
court to consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id.
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).

“Several factors influence

whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a
particular person was armed and dangerous.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,
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819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009). The factors include, but are not limited to,
whether: (1) “there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that resembled a
weapon”; (2) “the encounter took place at night or in a high crime area”; (3) “the
individual made threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the individual indicated
that he or she possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual appeared to be under the
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual “was unwilling to
cooperate”; and (7) the individual “had a reputation for dangerousness.”

Id.

(citations omitted); see State v. Crooks, 150 Idaho 117, 121, 244 P.3d 261, 265
(Ct. App. 2010) (“Notably, the Bishop Court did not indicate that its list of factors
to consider in determining the reasonableness of a belief that a suspect is armed
and dangerous was exhaustive.”). “Whether any of these considerations, taken
together or by themselves, are enough to justify a [pat] frisk depends on an
analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d
at 1218 (citations omitted). Ultimately, a frisk is constitutional so long as the
officer can “demonstrate how the facts he or she relied on in conducting the frisk
support the conclusion that the suspect posed a risk of danger.” Id.; see also
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009) (a patdown of a driver or
passenger during a traffic stop is justified if the police “harbor reasonable
suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous”).
Trooper Kagarice testified that after he initiated a traffic stop on the car in
which May was a passenger, he approached the vehicle and “noticed that both of
the female occupants were incredibly nervous” and both “displayed signs of
methamphetamine use.” (5/15/2012 Tr., p.7, L.1 – p.8, L.3.) Specifically, “[b]oth
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the driver and the passenger” had “open sores on their faces,” “sunken, dark, eye
sockets,” and decayed teeth, and both were “gaunt in appearance.” (5/15/2012
Tr., p.9, Ls.8-12.) They were also “very nervous and fidgety,” which is a sign of
“stimulant use.” (5/15/2012 Tr., p.9, Ls.13-14.) When asked if his observations
gave him a concern for officer safety, Trooper Kagarice explained:
Yes. Whenever I contact somebody and they’re nervous,
that really causes a concern for me because I don’t know why
they’re nervous. As I said, for a speeding violation, both occupants
of the vehicle shouldn’t be sweating. That makes me concerned as
an officer because I’m concerned about weapons, I’m concerned
about persons that may be wanted or otherwise dangerous or have
ill will planned towards law enforcement. I don’t know why they’re
nervous, so I have to assume the worst case scenario.
(5/15/2012 Tr., p.9, L.15 – p.10, L.1.)
When asked about additional officer safety concerns associated with
contacting

individuals

who

appear

to

be

under

the

influence

of

methamphetamine, Trooper Kagarice explained:
Any
kind
of
controlled
substance,
especially
methamphetamine, which is a stimulant, if they’re actually using the
substance or have used it in proximity to my contact with them, they
become very erratic, very, very irregular, they’re obviously not in
their right mind, which means that their responses may not be
normal at all.
(5/15/2012 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-10.)
Trooper Kagarice also described the furtive movements he observed
when talking to May and the driver:
While I was talking with them, they did make several furtive
movements. I asked for identification from both occupants of the
vehicle. As I was talking with the driver, I looked down and there
was a case or a box in the center console of the vehicle. As I
looked at it, the driver saw that I was looking at it and became very
nervous and immediately put it in the back seat without saying
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anything, like there was something she didn’t want me to see or
she was nervous about that being out.
As I was talking with the driver, the passenger, Ms. [May],
was getting very nervous because I was standing in very close
proximity to her standing in that doorway. She refused to make eye
contact with me, she was fidgeting nervously, twitching, bouncing
her feet and trying to dissipate energy. And what she would do is
she would actually turn her body to shift the weight up onto her left
hip, and shift her shoulder away from me, as she was facing away - towards the driver, kind of trying to put a barrier between myself
and her as I was talking to the driver.
(5/15/2012 Tr., p.10, L.15 – p.11, L.13.)
May’s furtive movements caused concern for officer safety because “[a]ny
time [Trooper Kagarice] make[s] a contact, especially in a vehicle, if someone is
moving a direction that is either away from [him] or someplace that is hidden,” it
“causes great concern” because Trooper Kagarice does not “know what they’re
trying to do, if they’re trying to conceal something or if they’re trying to reach for
something.” (5/15/2012 Tr., p.11, L.22 – p.12, L.4.) “In this case,” May “was
turning away from [him], which also would conceal objects on the left side of her
body, anyplace down towards the floorboard of the vehicle, and certainly
anything that would be upon her person.” (5/15/2012 Tr., p.12, Ls.4-9.)
As Trooper Kagarice continued to speak with May and the driver, their
“twitching,” “nervous bouncing of the legs, the shifting of the body, [and] the lack
of eye contact,” “became more pronounced and more visible.” (5/15/2012 Tr.,
p.14,

L.12 –

p.15, L.4.)

May’s behavior,

which

was indicative

of

methamphetamine use, introduces an element of “volatil[ity],” which presents a
safety concern.

(5/15/2012 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-13.)

Also relevant to Trooper

Kagarice’s concern was May’s clothing, which was “capable of concealing
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weapons that would be dangerous” to him, particularly once May was removed
from the “static environment” of the vehicle, which Trooper Kagarice needed to
do in order to conduct a search of the driver’s car pursuant to her probation
waiver. (5/15/2012 Tr., p.15, L.5 – p.17, L.10, p.18, L.15 – p.19, L.9.)
May’s behavior and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the traffic
stop would lead a reasonable person in Trooper Kagarice’s position to believe
that May was armed and dangerous. The district court correctly concluded that a
frisk under these circumstances was warranted. (5/17/2012 Tr., p.22, L.6 – p.29,
L.22; R., p.70.)
On appeal, May contends Trooper Kagarice frisked her because he
“apparently believe[s] that officers are always allowed to frisk lawfully detained
car passengers in order to maintain control,” and “because he presumes
everyone he stops is armed and dangerous.” (Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10.) This
argument is based on an inaccurate characterization of Trooper Kagarice’s
testimony.

While Trooper Kagarice undoubtedly testified that he assumes

someone is armed any time he has not confirmed otherwise, he articulated
specific reasons why he was concerned about May “[i]n this case.” (5/15/2012
Tr., p.17, L.11 – p.18, L.24.) The implication advanced by May, that the frisk was
conducted as a matter of course without any consideration of the circumstances
Trooper Kagarice faced during his encounter with May, is belied by the record.
Although May asserts that Trooper Kagarice frisked May because he
believes he is “allowed to” “in order to maintain control” and “because he
presumes everyone he stops is armed and dangerous,” May also contends “[t]he
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facts articulated by Trooper Kagarice did not justify the frisk.” (Appellant’s Brief,
p.12.) May then seeks to discredit each fact individually without regard to the
applicable legal standard, which requires consideration of the totality of the
circumstances.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.12-13.)

As the Court noted in Bishop,

determining whether a frisk is lawful “depends on an analysis of the totality of the
circumstances.” 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218. That May would prefer to
consider each fact in isolation is inconsistent with the applicable law and falls far
short of showing error by the district court.

Both the evidence and the law

support the conclusion that Trooper Kagarice lawfully frisked May.

May has

failed to establish any error in the denial of her suppression motion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm May’s conviction for
possession of methamphetamine.
DATED this 1st day of March, 2017.

_/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1st day of March, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
JASON C. PINTLER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

JML/dd

__/s/ Jessica M. Lorello________
JESSICA M. LORELLO
Deputy Attorney General
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